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Abstract  
“Green-grabbing”, in which environmental arguments support expropriation of land and 
resources, is a recognized element in neoliberal conservation. However, capitalism’s 
strategic interest in promoting the neoliberalization of conservation is accompanied by 
attempts to exploit hitherto protected natures without any pretence at “greenness”. In 
this paper we explore the dialectics between “green” and “un-green” grabbing as 
neoliberal strategies in the reconstruction of nature conservation policies after the 2008 
financial “crash” in Greece and the UK. In both countries, accelerated neoliberalization 
is manifested in diverse ways, including initiatives to roll back conservation regulation, 
market-based approaches to “saving” nature and the privatization of public nature 
assets. The intensification of “green” and “un-green” grabbing reflects capitalism’s 
strategic interest in both promoting and obstructing nature conservation, ultimately 
leaving for “protected natures” two choices: either to be further degraded to boost 
growth or to be “saved” through their deeper inclusion as commodities visible to the 
market. 
  
Keywords: neoliberal conservation, green grabbing, privatization, deregulation, 
neoliberalization of nature, economic crisis 
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“The old world is dying away, and the new world struggles to come forth:  1 
Now is the time of monsters.”  2 
Antonio Gramsci. Selections from Prison Notebooks, 1971. 3 
Introduction  4 
Since 2007 the world economy has been in a state of economic crisis, which has 5 
unfolded unevenly around the globe. Policy to confront the crisis has been profoundly 6 
neoliberal. It has involved austerity and retrenchment, coupled with liberalization in the 7 
form of deregulation and privatization of public property (Harvey 2011; Peck et al 8 
2012). Neoliberalism has framed responses to the crisis in many countries (Cahill 9 
2011), but has been particularly evident in the rescue or “bailout” packages from the EU 10 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for southern European economies. 11 
Nonhuman nature, including forms of “protected nature”, has not been immune from 12 
neoliberal measures. The intensification of the neoliberalization of nature, itself a crisis-13 
inducing process form of market-disciplinary regulatory restructuring (Peck et al 2012), 14 
has been a significant element of the post-crisis era. Nature remains the main source of 15 
wealth along with labour power (Marx 1890: 2002, p 523), and plays a key role to 16 
capital accumulation. 17 
  The framing of “wild nature” in terms of monetary value is rapidly becoming a 18 
hegemonic discourse (Roth and Dressler 2012) and the neoliberal mode of conservation 19 
is advancing across the globe. The latter has as a core axiom that “in order for natures to 20 
be “saved” conservation should be brought to the markets and private investment to 21 
variously conserved natures” (Büscher et al 2012). Neoliberal conservation not only 22 
portrays capitalism as the key to future ecological sustainability (Igoe et al 2010), 23 
obscuring capitalism’s environmental contradictions, but also uses ecosystem 24 
degradation as an opportunity for investment and further accumulation. The term “green 25 
grabbing” describes the new ways through which land or resources are appropriated for 26 
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environmental purposes (or, in the case of “green-washing”, are are justified by 27 
environmental arguments Apostolopoulou and Pantis 2010) with the ultimate goal of 28 
gaining profit (Corson et al 2013; Fairhead et al 2012). Such appropriations may reflect 29 
market opportunities associated with environmental legislation (e.g. to promote biofuel 30 
crops), responses to environmentalist fears (e.g. global food shortfall, or the loss of 31 
critical biodiversity), or direct appropriation of land for conservation that is 32 
subsequently made available as the basis for capitalist exploitation (e.g. ecotourism, 33 
carbon derivative trading, biodiversity offsets or species banking, Pawliczek and 34 
Sullivan 2011). In “green grabbing”, eco-friendly motivations are used simultaneously 35 
to hide policies that are destructive to both ecosystems and people and as a strategy by 36 
which capitalism seeks to advance itself as the means to “save nature”. These two 37 
disparate inclinations are brought together as a self-contained package: capitalism is 38 
used to solve environmental problems it has generated, in turn creating more problems 39 
and opportunities for capitalism to “help”; meanwhile all non-market based forms of 40 
conservation become illegible, progressively excluded from the dominant conservation 41 
discourse.  42 
 However, such “green grabbing” does not operate either without contradictions 43 
or evenly around the globe. Capitalism’s strategic interest in promoting a neoliberal 44 
version of conservation, via its further inclusion into market function, goes hand in 45 
glove with parallel processes whereby capitalism seeks to obstruct the conservation of 46 
species and ecosystems, and to grab and exploit hitherto protected natures without any 47 
“green” or “eco-friendly” argumentation. In this paper we term this latter process “un-48 
green” grabbing, and we suggest that attention needs to be paid to its importance in the 49 
engagement between capitalism and nature in the post-crisis era. We define “un-green” 50 
grabbing as a form of land or resource grabbing that involves the exploitation and 51 
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appropriation of protected natures. Unlike “green grabbing”, it is not done in the name 52 
of the environment (Fairhead et al 2012). It is a distinct subset of general capitalist land 53 
or resources appropriation, and its dialectics with “green grabbing” highlight the dual 54 
outcome of a single exploitative engagement of capitalism with nature and its profound 55 
challenges for the feasibility of a radical environmentalist position.  56 
 Neoliberalism is a diverse and interlinked set of practices reflecting a 57 
heightened, evolved and more destructive form of capitalism (Heynen and Robbins 58 
2005, p 6) designed to restore and consolidate capitalist class power (Harvey 2010, p 59 
18). Under neoliberalism, even though the state’s role as the central agent in the 60 
direction, legitimization and exercise of control over the use of nature is typically 61 
reduced (Castree 2008a, b), the state retains a role in the creation and preservation of an 62 
institutional framework for capital accumulation (Harvey 2005), and indeed in the 63 
protection of nature. Conservation by the state (e.g. protected areas and environmental 64 
legislation) constrains the freedom of capital to operate, and shapes its engagement with 65 
nature (e.g. protected landscapes and areas, regulation of development or pollution, 66 
incentives for eco-friendly behaviour, Adams et al 2014; Hodge and Adams 2012). We 67 
therefore believe that the state’s role remains critical in the balance between processes 68 
of “green” and “un-green” grabbing and in its changing dialectics in the post-crisis era.  69 
In this paper, we explore the dialectics between “green” and “un-green” 70 
grabbing as neoliberal strategies in the reconstruction of nature conservation policies in 71 
a post-crisis era. We consider the aftermath of the 2008 financial “crash”, using the 72 
example of Greece and the UK, two developed EU countries. We focus on the 73 
processes of deregulation, reregulation, commodification and privatization and pay 74 
particular attention to the ways in which these neoliberal policies can facilitate and 75 
promote both “green” and “un-green” grabbing. Given the intensification of “un-green” 76 
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grabbing in both countries in the post-crisis era we also explore the opposition that it 77 
can awaken.  78 
Greece and the UK share the formal structures of conservation common to all 79 
EU countries, but they have different state strategies, conservation histories and 80 
institutional regimes. These furnish interesting insights into the ways “actually-existing 81 
neoliberalisms” produce geographically distinct outcomes, offering insights towards 82 
understanding both the variegation and operational logic of neoliberalization (Büscher 83 
and Arsel 2012; Castree 2010; Neves and Igoe 2012).  84 
 85 
The contradictory character of nature conservation in the era of neoliberal 86 
capitalism  87 
The contradictory relationship between capitalism and nature has been extensively 88 
investigated in the Marxist tradition. O’Connor (1998, p 165) has even referred to a 89 
‘‘second contradiction of capitalism’’ associated with the undermining of capitalism’s 90 
conditions of production. The demand for profit along with the pursuit of accumulation 91 
for accumulation’s sake and the irreconcilable contradiction between use value and 92 
exchange value (Burkett 1999a) are not just characteristics of “greedy” capitalists; they 93 
rather lie at the heart of the capitalist mode of production. As Marx wrote in Capital 94 
(1890: 2002, p 199): the capitalist’s aim is to “produce not only a use-value, but a 95 
commodity also; not only use-value, but value; not only value, but at the same time 96 
surplus value”. It is this obsession with capital accumulation that distinguishes 97 
capitalism from the simple system for satisfying human needs it is portrayed as in 98 
mainstream economic theory and thus the natural environment is perceived by 99 
capitalism as a means, a “free” gift as Burkett (1999a) puts it, to the ends of profit-100 
making and capital accumulation (Sweezy 2004).  101 
 7 
 But what is the role of protected natures and nature conservation in the pursuit 102 
of capital accumulation context? Protected areas (PAs), and the totality of natures 103 
under conservation status, are land-controlling mechanisms (Kelly 2011) for specific 104 
purposes. The ostensible purpose is the protection of nature for the public good. A 105 
variety of often-contradictory driving forces, have shaped the history of conservation 106 
and PAs. Their establishment by the state and non-governmental actors secured 107 
ecosystems (and sometimes public access to land) in the face of degradation caused by 108 
capitalism’s expansion. Yet at the same time, their establishment often involved the 109 
displacement of local or indigenous people (Adams 2004). Protected areas enacted a 110 
radical separation of humans and nature, which as Marx argued in The Grundrisse 111 
(1857-1861) was essential to transforming the natural world into objects of exchange 112 
(Igoe et al 2010). Indeed, the way the protection of some areas implies the availability 113 
of nature elsewhere for exploitation, seems to reinforce the argument that “conditions 114 
for production may be created through environmental protection” (O’Connor 1998, p 115 
151).  116 
 Under capitalism, the state therefore has a complex double role, as “guardian” 117 
of both general capitalist class interests and nature. The clash between these roles has 118 
led to inadequate regulations to protect “the conditions of production” and ultimately to 119 
the degradation of ecosystems and the emergence of the “environmental crisis” (Foster 120 
1992). The core contradiction of conservation in capitalism lies precisely here: in the 121 
need to combine the preservation of nature as a resource for future capital 122 
accumulation with the exploitation to support current accumulation. Smith (2007) 123 
argued that since the 1970s, capitalism has dealt with this contradiction through 124 
environmental legislation and regulation to limit environmental despoliation at the 125 
hands of capital. This has effectively created a new scarcity: namely “allowable natural 126 
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destruction”. In the case of conservation, this is regulated by measures to protect 127 
specific habitats, species and ecosystems by constraining human activities.  128 
 The relationship between capitalism and conservation is contradictory, intense 129 
and diverse (Brockington and Duffy 2010; Büscher and Arsel 2012; Corson 2010; Igoe 130 
and Brockington 2007). Even though a non-exploitative relationship with nature cannot 131 
be achieved within capitalism, since it would require non-exploitative production 132 
relations, the particular ways through which this relationship is shaped as well as its 133 
material outcomes depend on the specifics of place and moment in history. Currently, 134 
capitalism attempts to gain profits from nature by its inclusion in the market not only 135 
through direct annexation and exploitation, but also through regulatory acts of 136 
conservation. These include attempts to legitimize itself as a socio-economic system 137 
that supports the sustainable use of natural resources in the form of the “green 138 
economy” (Corson et al 2013; MacDonald and Corson 2012; McAfee 1999; Sullivan 139 
2013b), and more broadly in supporting selected conservation activities. Neoliberal 140 
capitalism therefore promotes and frames mainstream conservation in order to render it 141 
open to capitalist expansion (Büscher et al 2012), proposing solutions to biodiversity 142 
loss and ecosystem degradation that hinge on the production and consumption of 143 
“ecological commodities” (Brockington and Duffy 2010) and on the assignment of 144 
prices to ecological phenomena. The increasing financialisation of nonhuman nature 145 
gradually renders it as the basis of strategies of accumulation (see Katz 1998; Smith 146 
2007).  147 
The processes of privatization, deregulation and reregulation are key aspects of 148 
the neoliberalization of nature conservation and have been decisive in the facilitation 149 
and consolidation of both “green” and “un-green” grabbing processes. Deregulation 150 
and reregulation play a key role in “rolling-back” state “interference” in conservation 151 
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so that state regulation is “light touch” and more actors become self-governing, and in 152 
“rolling-out” state policies that facilitate the further privatization and marketization of 153 
nature (Castree 2008a). The privatization of hitherto public assets has been a signal 154 
feature of the neoliberal project, aiming to open up new fields for capital accumulation 155 
(Harvey 2005) and it consists of the assignment of clear private property rights to 156 
social or environmental phenomena that were previously state-owned, unowned, or 157 
communally owned (Castree 2008a).  158 
In the current context, of a neoliberalism in crisis, we therefore witness not an 159 
end to nature’s exploitation but rather an intensification (see Smith 2010, p 266). As 160 
Harvey (2010, p 11) argues, financial crises “typically lead to reconfigurations, new 161 
models of development, new spheres of investment and new forms of class power”: 162 
that is also true of conservation. 163 
In the following section, we consider the similarities and differences between 164 
provisions for conservation in Greece and the UK. Then we explore the neoliberal 165 
restructuring of nature conservation in the post-crisis era by paying attention on the 166 
dialectics of green and un-green grabbing.  167 
  168 
Nature conservation in Greece and the UK 169 
The history of conservation in the UK and Greece shows significant differences in 170 
institutional arrangements and political-economic background that illustrate the 171 
variegated character of nature conservation under capitalism. 172 
 In Greece, conservation has historically been state-initiated and mostly done on 173 
public land. The first national parks were established in 1938 and 1971, in periods of 174 
rule by dictators. The relevant conservation laws reflected the conservative concept of 175 
“untouched wilderness” (Apostolopoulou et al 2012). Neoliberal elements were brought 176 
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into conservation during the 1990s: an increase in the number of PAs was accompanied 177 
by the emergence of various partnerships between statal, parastatal, voluntary and 178 
market actors. “Protected nature” was positioned as a potential source of profit through 179 
various EU-funded projects, green products and tourist investments, and several non-180 
state actors began to sit on important state committees whereas market proxies were 181 
clearly introduced in conservation legislation (e.g. law 2742/1999).  182 
 Although payments began to be made to private environmental actors, the 183 
private sector remained reluctant to invest in conservation. Capital perceived 184 
environmental legislation as threatening its interests, and governments avoided strict 185 
environmental controls on the freedom of landowners and businesses, on the grounds 186 
these would hinder economic development or private property rights (Apostolopoulou 187 
et al 2012). Delays, limited implementation, compromises and exceptions have been 188 
typical of attempts to pass conservation legislation (Apostolopoulou and Pantis 2009, 189 
2010).  190 
 In the UK, nature conservation was led by the state through the second half of 191 
the twentieth century. Until the end of the Second World War, PAs were almost all 192 
established on private land (Sheail 1976). Legislation passed by the Labour government 193 
in 1949 giving government a leading role in conservation, allowing creation of national 194 
parks and National Nature Reserves (Adams 2003). 195 
 Despite the engagement of the state, private landholders remained important to 196 
conservation: the majority of wildlife habitat, notified as Sites of Special Scientific 197 
Interest (SSSIs), existed on private land. In theory their value should have been taken 198 
into account in government decisions about planning and development, but business 199 
interests (and national economic arguments) often took precedence. Agriculture was 200 
exempt from planning, and intensification (backed by a strong private farming lobby) 201 
 11 
caused rapid ecological degradation. From the 1980s, agricultural support under the 202 
Common Agricultural Policy not only funded intensification, but also, under growing 203 
agri-environment schemes, enabled payments by the state to private landholders 204 
(including conservation trusts) for conservation management.  205 
 There are significant commonalities in the protection of nature in Greece and the 206 
UK, mainly due to the Europeanization of conservation since the 1990s. The heart of 207 
EU conservation policy is the Natura 2000 network of sites, containing the most 208 
valuable or endangered species and habitats, designated by national governments under 209 
the Birds and Habitats Directives. In the UK, Natura 2000 built directly on a pre-210 
existing system of designated conservation zones of national importance (Sites of 211 
Special Scientific Interest). On accession to the EU in 1981, Greece had no such system 212 
of protected sites. Since the Habitats Directive was transposed into Greek law in 1998, 213 
241 Sites of Community Importance (SCI) and 202 Special Protection Areas (SPAs) 214 
have been designated, forming the core conservation policy instrument in the country.  215 
 There are also both differences and similarities in the environmental movements 216 
in Greece and the UK. In the UK, the protection of wildlife, natural beauty and access to 217 
the countryside were important issues throughout the twentieth century (Adams 2003; 218 
Lowe et al 1987; Sheail 1976). Countryside conservation became a mass movement 219 
after the second world war: NGOs emerged and built large memberships, notably the 220 
National Trust (over a century old, with over three million members) and the Royal 221 
Society for the Protection of Birds and the Wildlife Trusts (both with about a million 222 
members). Some NGOs became substantial landowners, enabling them to become both 223 
the owners and managers of private land for conservation purposes (Adams 2003; 224 
Dwyer and Hodge 1996; Sheail 1976). In Greece, the environmental and conservation 225 
movement were smaller, and despite significant conservation conflicts (Apostolopoulou 226 
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and Pantis 2010) public environmental health was the key issue in environmental-social 227 
movements until struggles to protect conservation land from privatization and 228 
development projects developed in the twenty first century.  229 
  230 
Neoliberal restructuring of nature conservation in the post-crisis era  231 
Neoliberal restructuring and conservation in Greece 232 
In the first year following election of the PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) 233 
government in 2009, the prime minister emphasized that Greece was shifting towards a 234 
“green economy” model; on many occasions big environmental NGOs clearly 235 
supported this agenda, as indicating a “positive step”1. This green rhetoric soon faded 236 
and even though investments in areas such as renewable energy remained important, the 237 
governmental agenda ceased to be framed in terms of a “green economy” discourse. On 238 
the contrary, the government’s “Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policy”, 239 
published in 2011 and 2012
2, announced the creation of a “business-friendly Greece” 240 
(IMF 2011, p 143), marking a shift to fiscal austerity. The IMF and the EU played a 241 
decisive role in defining debt repayment as Greece’s priority: their reports regarding 242 
structural adjustment make no reference to terms like “biodiversity”, “nature”, 243 
“environment”, “sustainable development” or “green economy”, but instead to “growth” 244 
(i.e. IMF 2011, 2013; EC 2011); no room was made for even the rhetorical reference to 245 
capitalism’s ability to “save” nature. 246 
 Between 2010 and 2012, a variety of laws were promoted by both the PASOK 247 
government and its successor (a coalition between the centre-right and the centre-left 248 
parties elected in 2012). These fundamentally changed provisions for conservation and 249 
were related, in classic neoliberal fashion, to criticism of the efficiency, effectiveness, 250 
and reliability of the state and civil servants. New regulations were accompanied by an 251 
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increased role for the private sector and société anonymes, the downsizing of staff in 252 
environmental authorities, the merger of already understaffed environmental research 253 
institutes, and the dismantling of protected area administrations as well as a cut in funds 254 
for the Ministry of the Environment
3
.  255 
 In parallel to cuts in personnel and resources, an extensive deregulation began, 256 
aiming to boost investments by surpassing the obstacles of the legislation. Two laws 257 
(3853 and 3894 or the “fast-track” law) were passed in 2010 creating a “one stop shop” 258 
services for new businesses to attract investments and accelerate public-private 259 
partnerships. The “fast track” law defined a new category of “strategic investments” for 260 
which fundamental derogations from environmental law could be made to facilitate, 261 
inter alia, expropriations of public land. This opened up a route to “un-green grabbing”. 262 
The “fast track” law is applicable to all PAs types, except Natura 2000 areas of absolute 263 
protection and responsibility for its implementation was given to a société anonyme, 264 
called “Επενδύστε στην Ελλάδα A.E.” (“Invest in Greece S.A.”).  265 
 The Greek state had a central role as market manager in facilitating “strategic” 266 
investment, and releasing capital from the restrictions of environmental protection. This 267 
involved mobilization and transformation of the whole institutional framework of the 268 
state, reflecting a close interplay of deregulation and re-regulation (see also Peck 2001). 269 
This had been a significant trend since the 2000s but in 2011 it was significantly 270 
extended by the “Aid for Private Investment” law (3908), which aimed at promoting 271 
economic growth by introducing state aid for the private sector to improve 272 
entrepreneurship, technological development, and enterprises competitiveness.  273 
To facilitate “un-green grabbing” further, fundamental changes were made to 274 
environmental licensing, by simplifying and accelerating procedures to complete 275 
environmental impact assessments and approve environmental terms (IMF 2011; laws 276 
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3892/2011 and 4014/2011). Changes included exemption from environmental 277 
assessment of certain projects within Natura 2000 sites (e.g. housing development, 278 
shopping malls of up to 2,000 m
2
) and were combined with the permission to establish 279 
“Areas of Integrated Tourism Development” (POTA4). Some forms of land acquisition 280 
combined elements of “green” and “un-green” grabbing, notably the construction of 281 
renewable energy projects within PAs. Huge public subsidies were given to renewable 282 
energy projects (creating a debt accumulation in the Renewable Energy Account, IMF 283 
2013), and the government’s commitment to privatizing the Public Power Company 284 
(IMF 2013, p 172) was accompanied by land acquisition and development on land of 285 
conservation status. This “un-green” grab of protected land for ostensibly “green” 286 
purposes highlights the complex interplay of “green” and “un-green” grabbing. 287 
Again the deregulation of legislation was followed by new regulations to allow 288 
such developments. These were included in the biodiversity law (3937/2011) which was 289 
(surprisingly) welcomed by the biggest ten environmental NGOs
5
. New regulations not 290 
only opened PAs to further exploitation but also legitimized past derogations allowing, 291 
inter alia, the post-facto legalization of illegal buildings within PAs. The Government 292 
argued that legalization would require paying a fine which would be deposited in the 293 
“Green Fund” to offset adverse effects. In 2013, the Fund had 1,9 billion euros, 1,5 of 294 
which comes from arbitrary building
6. However, the “Green Fund” law (3889/2010) 295 
was amended twice, such that only 2.5% of funds could be used for environmental 296 
actions, while 97.5% would be transferred to the main state budget. 297 
Over the same period, several laws (e.g. laws 4030/2011; 4042/2011) further 298 
reduced the scope of forest legislation by favouring exceptions to rules about the 299 
creation of mountain refuges, ski centers or tourist facilities in forest areas. In 300 
September 2013, the Ministry of Environment released new a draft law for consultation 301 
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that proposed to declassify 15% of Greek territory, opening up real estate to lands that 302 
are mainly covered with sparse arboreal, maquis and phryganic vegetation.  303 
Underlying these policy developments was a commitment to the privatization of 304 
public land under the Greek structural adjustment program. The Hellenic Republic 305 
Asset Development Fund (HRADF) was established in 2011 under the medium-term 306 
fiscal strategy and launched “the largest declared divestment programme in the 307 
world”7, to attract revenue to be used for debt repayment. HRADF is a “société 308 
anonyme” (a private company, of which in this case the Hellenic Republic is the sole 309 
shareholder) and a Board of Directors, including business executives and two observers 310 
from the Eurozone and the EC, has the absolute authority on privatization decisions.  311 
 Natural areas have a prominent position in HRADF’s agenda, and claims about 312 
“pristine natural environment” and “great natural beauty” are used to attract 313 
investors
8
. The “Invest in Greece S.A.” website is dominated by images of Greek 314 
“unique” and “diverse” protected ecosystems (for example Ramsar sites)9. Public 315 
conservation land was included in privatization proposals from the very beginning: the 316 
initial list of state properties to be privatized (ICARP 2010
10
), included the area of 317 
Prasonisi (Isle of Rhodes), to be sold for mass tourism, including a Natura 2000 site 318 
(GR4210031
11). A few months later, HRADF’s portfolio included a new property in 319 
the area of Kassiopi (on Corfu), for the development of an upscale residential complex, 320 
including vacation villas and hotel/leisure facilities. The Kassiopi area included three 321 
inland wetlands for the protection of which the Ministry of Environment has started 322 
specific initiatives during 2012
12
. In September 2012, a new list was announced of 40 323 
islands available for development, 24 of which were Natura 2000 sites and four were 324 
within national parks
13
. In February 2013, the first 100% foreign direct investment in 325 
Greek public lands for the past 15 years was agreed: the board of HRADF granted a 326 
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concession for 99 years
14
 over Kassiopi to NCH Capital, an American fund
15
. In the 327 
same month, a law passed from the Parliament further facilitating the leasing of 328 
islands
16
 whereas few months later a new island (Issos) was added to the HRADF’s 329 
portfolio again including a Natura 2000 site.  330 
 The government’s willingness to sell and the private sector’s willingness to 331 
buy, protected land, both in line with IMF’s requirements, faced the same obstacle: 332 
“strict” legislation. The former minister of the Environment and the Executive Director 333 
for housing at the HRADF argued in March
17
 and in September
18
 of 2012 respectively, 334 
that environmental licensing legislation was one of the main barriers in state’s attempts 335 
to boost investment and allow development of public property by third parties. In April 336 
2012, the EC also noted in its publication “Growth for Greece” that land-use planning 337 
and environmental licensing rules were often “obstacles to investment”19. In September 338 
2012, an interview with a consultant of “Private Islands Inc.” was published in Greek 339 
blogs entitled “Change the laws and you will sell all your islands”. In this context, the 340 
Minister for the Environment in a meeting of EU Ministers of Environment (Vilnius, 341 
July 2013) characterized Greek PAs as “over-protected” and “hostile ... to economic 342 
activity”20.  343 
  344 
Neoliberal restructuring and conservation in the UK 345 
In the UK, transformations in provision for conservation following the crash began with 346 
the change of government at the 2010 elections. The Labour government was defeated, 347 
and a collation was formed between the centre-right Conservative and the centre left 348 
Liberal Democrat parties. Post election policy showed this to be strongly liberal in 349 
ideology, with a Budget focused on rapid reduction of the deficit in public accounts. 350 
The shift to fiscal austerity matched (or even exceeded) the budget of 1981 (Keegan 351 
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2010), introduced under the first conservative government of Margaret Thatcher (1979-352 
83), the UK’s archetypal proponent of neoliberalism. Yet the new Prime Minister, the 353 
Conservative David Cameron, claimed in May 2010, during a visit to the Department of 354 
Energy and Climate Change, that he wanted the new administration to be the “greenest 355 
government ever” (Randerson 2010).  356 
 A key feature of this attempt at deficit reduction was cuts to government 357 
departments and quasi-autonomous government bodies (QUANGOs), alongside public 358 
services. A number of environmental organisations were targeted, such as the Royal 359 
Commission on Environmental Pollution and the Sustainable Development 360 
Commission. By the autumn, the RSPB observed that the UK was entering “a period of 361 
deep and prolonged green austerity” (Comerford et al 2010). The October Spending 362 
Review spelled out the deep cuts faced by the Department for Environment, Food and 363 
Rural Affairs (DEFRA). These reached 30% (£700m by 2014-15), compared to an 364 
average of 19% across government. Significant reductions in Natural England staff 365 
numbers were reported (The Guardian reported 5-8,000 out of 30,000, Jowitt 2010). 366 
 In the Coalition Agreement published on 20 May 2010, the incoming 367 
government committed itself to a range of actions aimed at reducing regulation of 368 
businesses. These included a commitment to cut “red tape”, introducing a “one-in, one-369 
out” rule whereby no new regulation would be brought in without other regulation being 370 
cut by a greater amount. There was also a commitment to replace what was described as 371 
a culture of “tick-box” regulation with “targeted inspections of high-risk organizations” 372 
through “co-regulation and improved professional standards”21. 373 
 In July 2011, the government announced a drastic simplification of planning 374 
regulations controlling development (GOV.UK 2011). It proposed to cut over a 375 
thousand pages of planning advice to around 50 pages, to “encourage sustainable 376 
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[economic] growth” (Vaughan 2012). Notwithstanding the rhetoric of “sustainable 377 
development”, the government’s aims were clear: “growth at any environmental cost to 378 
jolt the nation’s flatlining economy” (Vaughan 2012).  379 
 Perhaps the most significant way in which neoliberalization found purchase in 380 
public policy for conservation after 2008 is through the idea of nature providing 381 
“ecosystem services” (Norgaard 2010). This rhetorical and material strategy is a key 382 
feature of the neoliberal turn in conservation (Brockington and Duffy 2010; Büscher et 383 
al 2012; Hodge and Adams 2012), and a key determinant in strategies of “green 384 
grabbing”. The concept of ecosystem services provides a means by which nature can be 385 
made visible to capital (Robertson 2006). It makes ecological functions subject to 386 
exchange and sale (Kosoy and Corbera 2010), and provides a standard metric for nature 387 
allowing it to be commodified (Robertson 2004). The construction of nature as a 388 
“service provider” (Sullivan 2009) in this way is a fundamentally neoliberal strategy, 389 
the essential step to the financialisation of nature (Robertson 2004; Sullivan 2013a, b).  390 
 The idea of nature as a source of wealth (The Secretary of State for the 391 
Environment referred to ‘Mother Nature’s Bank’ in launching the 2011 Environment 392 
White Paper)
22, matched both the new government’s conservative ideology and its 393 
views of the fiscal requirements of retrenchment in public finances following the bailout 394 
of the private banking sector. The UK government engaged strongly with the 395 
Convention on Biological Diversity’s “ecosystem approach”, especially Principle 5, 396 
expressed the importance of conservation of ecosystem structure and functioning in 397 
terms of the need “to maintain ecosystem services” (CBD 2013). The concept of 398 
“ecosystem services” was placed at the core of government environmental policy-399 
making and delivery (Hopkins 2013). The UK National Ecosystem Assessment (NEA), 400 
published in 2011, sought to provide a complete account of the ecosystems that could 401 
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be held to comprise natural value (UK NEA 2011). Ecosystem services were 402 
fundamental to The UK government White Paper on the natural environment, The 403 
Natural Choice: securing the value of nature (DEFRA 2011). The UK government also 404 
established a Natural Capital Committee, to report to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 405 
and an Ecosystem Markets Task Force “to gain the maximum benefits for UK 406 
businesses from new market opportunities which protect and improve natural capital” 407 
(DEFRA 2013a).  408 
 A key element of UK government strategy to create economically efficient links 409 
between capital and nature was the concept of “biodiversity offsets”. These involve 410 
allowing losses to biodiversity in one place (and at one time) to be compensated by 411 
gains elsewhere. Thus valuable nature need no hold up development: habitats can 412 
simply be created (or the protection of existing habitats enhanced) elsewhere. The 413 
approach is controversial within conservation because of conceptual flaws and problems 414 
of compliance and monitoring (Bull et al 2013), and is widely critiqued in accounts of 415 
the neoliberalization of conservation (e.g. Pawliczek and Sullivan 2011, Sullivan 416 
2013b). DEFRA tested the approach with the government conservation adviser Natural 417 
England, and local governments in six pilot areas in England, and published a 418 
discussion paper in September 2013
23
. Further development involved DEFRA and a 419 
series of private organisations (including engineering consultants and contractors and 420 
the aggregates industry). In November 2013, the Parliamentary Environmental Audit 421 
Committee described the approach as simplistic and an admission of failure of the 422 
planning system: it suggested the approach should be put on hold
24
. Newspapers 423 
described the approach as “a license to trash nature” (Carrington 2013).  424 
The UK government’s enthusiasm for the ecosystem service approach (backed 425 
by engagement from ecologists and conservationists, for example in the NEA) was 426 
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accompanied by a specific attempt to promote un-green grabbing by privatising public 427 
nature assets by selling off state conservation and forestry land. In August 2010, the 428 
government proposed the sale of National Nature Reserves (NNRs; Jowitt et al 2010), 429 
and in October, it proposed the sale of the government Forestry Commission estate. 430 
One newspaper commented that the government seemed intent on “asset-stripping our 431 
national heritage” (Hickman 2010).  432 
 Debate over sale of government forests proved more protracted and if anything 433 
more controversial (Lucas 2011), particularly over the question of public access to 434 
forest land (Hodge and Adams 2013). The debate focused on England, since the 435 
Scottish Government and Welsh Assembly Government rapidly distanced themselves 436 
from the policy, although on-going forest sales in Scotland were in fact extensive 437 
(Johnson 2011). Although, speaking to the House of Lords Environment Committee in 438 
November 2010, Jim Paice, Minister of State for Agriculture and Food, acknowledged 439 
that the sale reflected the need to balance the government’s books following the 440 
banking crash, saying “I am not going to avoid the issue here - there is a need for 441 
capital receipts”25, the Environment Secretary claimed that “this is not a fire sale by a 442 
cash-strapped state” (Spelman 2010).  443 
  444 
Opposition to ungreen grabbing in Greece 445 
In Greece, the government’s neoliberal agenda has been mainly criticised by parties of 446 
the radical and communist Left
26
. The biggest environmental NGOs have been trapped 447 
in highly contradictory positions. They have welcomed initiatives that they considered 448 
positive (such as the presidential decree for wetlands protection or the biodiversity law), 449 
while criticising others that they considered to be negative (such as laws regarding 450 
environmental licensing and forests or attempts to lease islands)
27
. NGOs have been in a 451 
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particularly awkward position in relation to the EU. In previous decades it had been 452 
common for Greek NGOs to blame the government for not implementing EU 453 
conservation policy. However, now NGOs such as WWF International are seeking (in 454 
vain) to enlist EU support against the environmental impacts of rapid economic 455 
restructuring in Greece (Rehn and Potočnik 2012).  456 
The most significant struggles against privatization and deregulation have been 457 
from local committees. From 2010, communities on Rhodes and Corfu expressed their 458 
objection to the privatization of Kassiopi and Prasonisi, and in the case of Kassiopi they 459 
treated the conservation status of Natura 2000 sites as official
28
. The municipality of 460 
Corfu, the Region of Ionian Islands and island’s residents appealed to the Council of the 461 
State against the decision to grant a concession to NCH Capital. Similar opposition is 462 
now being expressed for the case of Issos Island.  463 
 A prime example of local protest against the privatization of nature assets 464 
concerns a proposed gold mine in the primeval forest of Skouries (Ηalkidiki, NE 465 
Greece). Previous efforts to implement a mining investment plan were cancelled by the 466 
Council of the State in 2002 due to their severe environmental impacts. In 2011 and 467 
after several transfers of the assets between companies with the mediation of the state, 468 
the mines were transferred to the “Eldorado Gold Corporation”, a Canadian company, 469 
and the Environmental Impact Assessment was approved. The area of exploitation 470 
covered 26,400 ha with 90% forest cover, including Natura 2000 sites
27
. Since 2011 471 
mass demonstrations have been organized against the expansion of mining activities. In 472 
March 2012, the first 410 ha of public forest were conceded to begin the project’s 473 
implementation. Several scientific bodies also expressed strong opposition, 474 
charactering the project as a violent intervention in a unique natural area with 475 
irreversible impacts. However, the government emphasized the scale of investment at 476 
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Skouries, bringing jobs and local welfare and formed a coalition, including scientists 477 
and local authorities, to support the project’s implementation29 while forcefully 478 
repressing environmental struggles
30
.  479 
 Despite the violent repression of demonstrations, key non-state actors and 480 
media have adopted the government’s line of rhetoric, even where they have otherwise 481 
sought a “green” profile. Thus SKAI television (whose website often portrays staff 482 
engaged in volunteer environmental activities
31
), has systematically criticized the 483 
struggles against the exploitation of Skouries
32
. Similarly, the newspaper Kathimerini 484 
equated them with the actions of neo-nazis (Golden Dawn) in East Attica
33
. During 485 
October 2013, 27 anti-goldmine activists of Chalkidiki were charged with the same 486 
crime as the leaders of Golden Dawn: formation of a criminal organization. 487 
The Skouries movement has gained international solidarity, with 488 
demonstrations around the world. The citizens of Chalkidiki have placed their 489 
opposition to the current development model at the core of their struggle and have 490 
criticized both the unprecedented criminalization of their struggle and the unequal 491 
distribution of costs and benefits of the project
34
: profits for Eldorado and Hellenic 492 
Gold corporations and costs to the community in the form of ecological impacts, public 493 
health (e.g. pollution of water resources, soil and air) and traditional economic 494 
activities (e.g. agriculture, livestock, apiculture, fishing, aquaculture, organic farming 495 
and beekeeping
35
).  496 
 497 
Opposition to ungreen grabbing in the UK 498 
In the UK, when the government suggested privatising National Nature Reserves in 499 
2010, conservation NGOs found themselves in an awkward position. Some held 500 
discussions with government about which NNRs they might accept and the terms under 501 
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which they might do so. Most looked like unattractive acquisitions: isolated and 502 
expensive to manage. The government conservation adviser, Natural England, also 503 
explored the possibility of creating a new charity specifically to manage NNRs. Neither 504 
option was cheap, and both would need considerable public subsidy. While the 505 
government might have hoped for the “Big Society” to take on the costs and managing 506 
public assets of high conservation value, the intention to reduce government 507 
expenditure precluded provision of the resources needed to make NGO management 508 
sustainable. The government retreated: on 4 February 2011, the Secretary of State for 509 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Caroline Spelman, announced the end of plans 510 
to remove NNRs from public ownership (Mendick 2011). 511 
 There was a similar sharp public backlash against the proposed forest sales. In 512 
January 2011, as the government began a public consultation on the proposal, a 513 
YouGov poll found that 84% of people agreed the woods and forests should be kept in 514 
public ownership for future generations (Carrington 2011). The protection of 515 
biodiversity on forest land, and public access, were important issues (Hodge and 516 
Adams 2013). By mid February, over half a million people had signed a petition on the 517 
web site 38 Degrees to “save our forests – don’t sell them off to the highest bidder”36, 518 
the strength of opposition surprising both government and NGOs. Conservation NGOs 519 
were vilified for their cautious approach, failing to back the public campaign and 520 
apparently willing to cherry pick forests of high conservation value (Porritt 2011). The 521 
national campaign was successful. On 16 February, the Prime Minister announced the 522 
end of plans to sell forests, and abandonment of the consultation that had been due to 523 
run for a further nine weeks (Watt and Vidal 2011). The government appointed an 524 
Independent Panel to review of forestry policy. After widespread consultation, its final 525 
report in 2013 concluded that the public forest estate should be retained in public 526 
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ownership, and held “in trust for the nation”, and they proposed the appointment of 527 
“guardians” or “trustees” directly accountable to Parliament to oversee forest 528 
management. The recommended an expansion in the area of woodland in England 529 
(from 10% to 15% of land area) by 2060. These recommendations were subsequently 530 
almost entirely accepted by government (DEFRA 2013b). 531 
There has also been local opposition to the sale of public nature assets and 532 
developments proposed by commercial interests. In addition to the large national 533 
campaign against public forest privatization, here were local campaigns, for example 534 
HOOF (Hands Off Our Forest), to keep public ownership (and commoners’ rights) in 535 
the ancient Forest of Dean
37
. There was also extensive local opposition to the proposal 536 
by the American Trump Organisation to build a golf resort complex on the Scottish 537 
coast North of Aberdeen (Arts and Maffey 2013). The Trump Organisations purchased 538 
the Menie Estate in 2006, including a large area of undeveloped sand dunes, part of 539 
which was a SSSI. The government conservation organisation, Scottish Natural 540 
Heritage, advised against the development, and Aberdeenshire Council turned the 541 
application down in 2007. The Scottish Government “called in” the application, 542 
claiming it was a decision of national (Scottish) significance because of the number of 543 
jobs it would create. In 2008 the decision was overturned and planning permission 544 
granted (Ford 2011). The Trump Organisation began to try to buy out local landowners. 545 
Local protests, about the development itself, the way the decisions were taken, and 546 
(increasingly) the way protests were policed, mushroomed. A movie about the protests 547 
was made in 2011, and shown by the BBC in 2012
38
. The golf course complex was 548 
officially opened in March 2012
39
. A petition with over 11,000 signatures was lodged 549 
with the Scottish Parliament in March 2013 asking for a public inquiry into the handling 550 
of the development by national and local governments (Arts and Maffey 2013).  551 
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The dialectics of green and un-green grabbing under capitalism in crisis 552 
Governments in both UK and Greece have used the economic crisis as a “Trojan horse” 553 
to enable the further neoliberalization of nature conservation. The intensification of 554 
“green” and “un-green” grabbing by showing in a sense the two sides of the capitalist 555 
coin can capture the deepening of the contradictory ways in which capitalism under 556 
crisis engages with “protected natures”. On the one hand capitalism actively promotes a 557 
neoliberal version of conservation, leading to conservation increasingly becoming “the 558 
friend of capitalism” (Büscher et al 2012). On the other hand, capitalism actively 559 
obstructs conservation to allow the exploitation of hitherto protected land perceiving 560 
conservation to be an “enemy” to unlimited capital accumulation.  561 
Attention to the dialectics of “un-green” and “green” grabbing is of crucial 562 
importance for three main reasons. First, even though the appropriation and degradation 563 
of nature has been at the core of the capitalist enterprise, the current intensification of 564 
“un-green grabbing” marks a new era where governments are forcefully taking back 565 
environmental regulations that have been shaped by the competition among capitals but 566 
also won through environmental and social movements and hard class struggle (Harvey 567 
2005; Vlachou 2005). The establishment of PAs resulted from such a conjunction of 568 
factors and, crucially, the rolling back of conservation frameworks designed to protect 569 
ecosystems from degradation along with the reversion of public conservation land into 570 
the private domain entails the loss of rights (Harvey 2005, p 161). In the post-crisis era, 571 
capital has sought to intensify the exploitation of protected natures through “un-green 572 
grabbing”, a process made possible because capital has been able, to a large extent, to 573 
make the state apparatus its own entrepreneurial entity, “a purer catalyst of capitalist 574 
expansion than ever before” (Smith 2010, p 260).  575 
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Second, it shows the radical transformation that neoliberal logics and practices 576 
pose to our theoretical and political understanding of the social relationship with nature 577 
while implying contradictory normative assumptions about nature itself. Neoliberal 578 
conservation accepts the capitalist framing of protected nature as underpinning value, 579 
and the absence of market pricing is blamed for limiting conservation success. 580 
Ecosystem services science is pivotal to such approaches, both quantifying ecosystem 581 
services as measured, transactable units across space and time (Robertson 2004), and 582 
attributing monetary values and rendering nonhuman nature conceptually “docile” 583 
(Sullivan 2013a). Meanwhile, in the context of “un-green grabbing”, protected nature is 584 
framed by capitalism (and the neoliberal state) as holding back the creation of value and 585 
potentially in conflict with development and growth. This contradictory representation 586 
of protected natures reflects specific material conditions and particularly the fact that 587 
the tensions within capitalist politics over ensuring that the free gifts of nature are both 588 
available to capital on an easy basis and also sustained for future use have become acute 589 
(see also Harvey 2010, p 76).  590 
Indeed, the dialectics of “green” and “un-green” grabbing as played out in 591 
Greece and UK shed light on the fact that there is no common, global, capitalist strategy 592 
consisting of a commitment to promote neoliberal conservation; the relationship 593 
between capitalism and conservation is contradictory and thus unstable and uncertain in 594 
its outcomes (see also Vlachou 2005). Currently, the ultimate result of the dialectics of 595 
“green” and “un-green” grabbing is the deepening of the production of nature both 596 
quantitatively, through the rapid intensification of exploitation, and qualitatively, 597 
through adding new elements in nature’s exploitation. The why behind the simultaneous 598 
intensification of the “real” and “formal” (Smith 2007) subsumption of nature is 599 
strongly related to capitalism’s environmental contradictions which neoliberalism 600 
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makes manifest more than any other mode of environmental governance (McCarthy and 601 
Prudham 2004) and further deepens them during periods of economic crisis (Peck et al 602 
2012). The crisis has been used by capital as an engine of capitalist restructuring, 603 
jockeying for a better position (Harvey 2011) by, inter alia, securing public assets and 604 
carving out new areas for capital accumulation. Biodiversity conservation, in as much 605 
as it is instrumental to capitalism’s growth and reproduction (Brockington and Duffy 606 
2010), has a particular role in this context: to create “new symbolic and material spaces 607 
for global capital expansion” (Corson 2010, p 579). However, this is just one side of the 608 
story. Even though mainstream nature conservation (Igoe et al 2010) has been reshaped 609 
by a significant penetration of capitalism into conservation discourse and practice, we 610 
argue that it has not yet achieved a complete transformation of conservation to a “win-611 
win” scenario for capitalist interests: conservation legislation is still a barrier to the 612 
unlimited grabbing of public land, as the Greek case clearly shows.  613 
Third, the fact that “green” and “un-green” grabbing processes unfold unevenly 614 
in Greece and the UK sheds light on different state strategies and governmental 615 
responses. In Greece, the primary strategy does not address the benefits for biodiversity 616 
conservation that could result from its inclusion in market relations but rather its further 617 
exploitation through capitalist development. In the UK, perhaps because of the 618 
importance of private landowners and enterprises to the delivery of conservation, and a 619 
highly market-orientated public culture (three decades after Thatcherist privatisation), 620 
strategies pointing towards the argument that creating green markets is necessary for 621 
saving biodiversity appear much stronger.  622 
 As Marx (1890: 2002, p 779) explained in the first volume of the Capital “public 623 
debt becomes one of the most potent levers of primitive accumulation”. In Greece, the 624 
paroxysmal character of the crisis and the springing of the “debt trap” (Harvey 2005, p 625 
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162) are being systematically used to justify, inter alia, the deregulation of 626 
environmental legislation and the privatization of public nature (and other) assets, 627 
fulfilling longstanding demands from the private sector. Even before the crisis, Greek 628 
capital was in most cases fighting against environmental regulation. Given the limited 629 
success in establishing strategies to derive profit through the conservation of nature per 630 
se, the market-based conservation strategy attractive to state and capital in the UK held 631 
no appeal. The debt crisis was used as an argument to legitimize “un-green grabbing” 632 
through overturning the barriers of environmental legislation in order to further exploit 633 
“protected” natures and facilitate investment. The policy of massive privatization by 634 
offering capital cut-price opportunities for profitability, establishes in a EU country an 635 
accumulation model previously tried out in the Global South and the countries of 636 
Eastern Europe (Kouvelakis 2012).  637 
 However, in both countries there is a post-crisis intensification of “un-green 638 
grabbing”, which has been opposed by the public. Even though there are in both 639 
countries cases of governmental suppression of struggles there are also differences in 640 
the political handling of opposition which raise important issues. In the UK, strong civil 641 
society organizations, and a less acute debt crisis, partly constrained neoliberal 642 
strategies such as the sale of state nature assets. In Greece, in the context of an 643 
increasing crisis of hegemony (in Gramscian terms), forced imposition of extreme 644 
neoliberal reforms became possible, not only under the threat of bankruptcy but also 645 
through upgrading the role of the EU and the IMF and delegating responsibilities to 646 
société anonymes. The parallel intensification of autocratic governance and “un-green 647 
grabbing” processes has contributed to the emergence of conservation struggles in 648 
Greece where mobilized social groups are fighting for the protection of conservation 649 
land - being “conservationists” without naming themselves as such.  650 
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Overall, the intensification of “green” and “un-green” grabbing reflects the 651 
inherent weaknesses of the capitalist system in formulating a positive response to the 652 
challenge of managing the biophysical world (Harvey 2011). Ecological decline can 653 
threaten capitalist production in the long term, however, individual capitalists, working 654 
in their own short-term interests and impelled by competition laws are perpetually 655 
tempted to adopt the position “après moi le deluge” (Marx 1890: 2002, p 282) with 656 
respect to both the labourer and the soil (Harvey 2010, p 71). The latter is obvious in the 657 
case of “un-green grabbing” but it can also be evident in the case of “green grabbing” 658 
which despite the hegemonic framing, as a successful strategy for nature conservation, 659 
is itself a growth industry (see also Burkett 1999b) through which “corporate capitalism 660 
manages to reframe a genuinely use-value concern”, such as halting the degradation of 661 
ecosystems, “into a question of economic value that is entirely inimical to the original 662 
concern” (Smith 2010, p 249), ultimately creating a version of conservation that is an 663 
image of itself. Overall, both the Greek and UK cases show that the current post-crisis 664 
production of nature does not signal just an expansion of capitalist economy toward the 665 
industrialisation of new resources, but the making of a new social world (Smith 2007; 666 
Robertson 2012) leaving for “protected” natures two choices: either to be further 667 
degraded to boost growth or to be “saved” through their deeper inclusion as 668 
commodities visible to the market.  669 
 In this context, radical conservation scholarship faces a potential deadlock: in 670 
opposing mainly neoliberal conservation and “green grabbing” and de-emphasizing 671 
“un-green grabbing”, it is at risk of positioning itself against any possible form of nature 672 
conservation. In response, we suggest that opposition to the capital appropriation of 673 
nature, either with or without “green” argumentation, needs to be balanced by 674 
recognition of the rights of citizens to seek to oppose the degradation of ecosystems. 675 
 30 
Opposition to land grabs by capital (or the state on behalf of capital) and to the 676 
deregulation of environmental legislation do not imply support for the neoliberal model 677 
of mainstream conservation. It means acknowledgement of the possibility of a positive 678 
relationship between human society and non-human nature through radical change. To 679 
address such dilemmas it is of critical importance to disentangle the genuine material 680 
concern about and opposition to ecosystem degradation and biodiversity loss from the 681 
specific ways that capitalism responds to them, and thus to ask by whom conservation is 682 
promoted or obstructed in each case and for what purposes. It is therefore an important 683 
question whether, in the era of capitalism in crisis, there are potential anticapitalistic 684 
elements in emerging conservation struggles.  685 
 686 
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